Long-term care for older people: economic issues by unknown
LONG-TERM CARE FOR OLDER 
PEOPLE: ECONOMIC ISSUES  
 
Raphael Wittenberg 
Personal Social Services Research Unit, LSE 
Centre for Health Services Economics & Organisation, Oxford 
Myers JDC Brookdale Institute, Jerusalem 
25 December 2013 
  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
• Funders: Department of Health, UK Research 
Councils, AXA Research Fund and others 
• Research Team:  
– LSE: Adelina Comas, Jose-Luis Fernandez, Bo Hu, 
Derek King, Juliette Malley, Linda Pickard 
– University of Oxford: Chris Eleftheriades 
– University of East Anglia: Ruth Hancock, Marcello 
Morciano 
– University of Newcastle: Carol Jagger 
OUTLINE OF PRESENTATION 
• Long-term system in England 
• Policy context 
• Key economic issues 
• Assessment and eligibility framework 
• Financing long-term care 
• Projections of future expenditure 
• Conclusions 
 
LONG-TERM CARE 
• Definitions of long-term care can vary 
between countries, complicating comparisons 
• The UK Government in a recent major report 
defines it as ‘care and support [which] enables 
people to do the everyday things that most of 
us take for granted: things like getting out of 
bed, dressed and into work…’ 
• It can include social care, long-term health 
care, supported housing, disability benefits 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
• Central governments in the four UK countries are 
responsible for overall policy and funding of health 
and social care 
• Local authorities are responsible for assessing needs, 
setting eligibility criteria and arranging and funding 
social services locally  
• Clinical Commissioning Groups are responsible in 
England for arranging health services locally 
• Social security disability benefits are the 
responsibility of the UK government  
 
MIXED ECONOMY OF SUPPLY 
• Family, especially in case of older people 
spouses and adult children, provide most care 
• Most formal social care is provided by the 
private sector and not-for-profit sector 
• Local authorities contract with the 
independent providers who also contract 
direct with users purchasing their own care 
• Local authorities’ direct provision is now fairly 
limited in most areas 
MIXED ECONOMY OF FINANCE 
• Unpaid informal carers: substantial 
opportunity costs of caring 
• Central taxation: health care, part of social 
care (via block grants to local authorities) and 
disability benefit costs 
• Local taxation: part of social care costs 
• Users of services: user charges for social care 
and costs of privately purchased care    
 
FINANCING SYSTEM IN THE UK 
• Health care free of charge at point of use 
throughout UK 
• Nursing care in nursing homes also free 
throughout the UK 
• Personal care free in Scotland but subject to user 
charges in rest of the UK 
• Hotel costs in care homes and domestic help 
subject to charges throughout UK 
• Disability (cash) benefits are not subject to means 
test, throughout the UK 
ELIGIBILITY FOR SOCIAL CARE 
• Assessment of care needs: local authorities set 
their own eligibility criteria within general 
government central guidance 
• Financial assessment: central system for 
residential care charging across England but 
local system for home care charging subject to 
general central guidance 
 
RESIDENTIAL CARE 
• 325,000 older people – some 3.5% of older 
population - in care homes 
• Majority are female, aged 85+, used to live 
alone, cognitively impaired, high level of 
functional disability  
• 170,000 funded by local authority, 25,000 by 
the NHS and 130,000 privately (estimates) 
HOME-BASED CARE 
• Some 500,000 older people receive publicly 
funded community care, including 265,000 
receiving home care or cash payments 
• At least 150,000 receive privately funded 
home care, possibly more (estimate) 
• There is considerable movement in and out of 
receipt of home care 
POLICY CONTEXT 
• Concern over future affordability of long-term care 
for older people 
– highly labour-intensive 
– potentially rising expectations  
– increasing numbers living to late old age 
– uncertainty over numbers who will need care 
• Debate over the last decade about the appropriate 
balance between public and private funding  
 
CARING FOR OUR FUTURE 
JULY 2012 WHITE PAPER 
• Quality of care 
• Personalisation 
• Prevention 
• Support for carers 
• Eligibility criteria 
 
 
• Workforce 
• Protection 
• Integration 
• Information 
• Financing system 
OBJECTIVES OF THE WELFARE STATE 
• Insurance of all against risks like illness and 
unemployment 
• Redistribution toward those with greater 
needs - such as for medical care, disability, or 
family circumstances 
• Smoothing out the level of income over the 
life cycle 
• Stepping in where the family ‘fails’....      
 (Hills, 1997) 
KEY ECONOMIC ISSUES 
• Managing risk 
 
• Economic incentives and efficiency 
 
• Equity 
 
• Fiscal sustainability 
 
MANAGING RISK  
• One of the key objectives of the welfare state is to 
pool risks of adverse events such as illness or 
unemployment  
• The risk of needing long-term care in old age seems 
an obvious risk for the state to pool at least to some 
degree 
• Pooling risks is usually more efficient than each 
individual taking their own risk 
• There are however considerable challenges in 
insuring the risk of needing long- term care 
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND 
EFFICIENCY 
The way long-term care is funded may affect 
incentives: 
• To work and to save 
• To provide unpaid care for family and friends 
• To prefer some types of care to others 
• To purchase private insurance if available 
 
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
• Productive efficiency – needs assessment and 
financial assessment processes should be 
carried out at minimum cost 
• Efficiency in product mix – the mix of care and 
support services available to users should be 
those they want to buy 
• Efficiency in consumption – care and support 
should be directed to those who value the 
services most highly 
EQUITY 
• Equity is one of the drivers of reform in long-
term care policy, but equity of what? 
– Inputs 
– Access and capabilities 
– Outcomes 
•  Which inequalities are fair and which are 
unfair? 
– Age  
– Diagnosis 
– Geography 
 
EQUITY 
• Redistribution from lower care needs  
   to higher care needs 
• Redistribution from wealthier people 
 to poorer people 
• Dependent on provision of informal care 
for parents or payment toward parents’ care 
• Dependent on past contributions 
 
SUSTAINABILITY 
• If the care system is unsustainable, it is likely to be 
inequitable to future generations 
• It is also likely to be inefficient, since people will be 
unable to plan for potential care needs 
• Fiscal sustainability means that the framework 
should not create excessive cost pressures in broader 
public sector budgets 
• Political sustainability means that the framework 
should be supported by key stakeholders and should 
be sufficiently forward-looking and flexible  
FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY 
The European Commission (2009) project that 
public expenditure will rise:  
• Long-term care from 1.2% of GDP in 2007 to 2.4% of 
GDP in 2060 
• Health care from 6.7% of GDP in 2007 to 8.2% of GDP 
in 2060 
• Pensions from 10.2% of GDP in 2007 to 12.6% of GDP 
in 2060 
•How are these rises to be funded? 
 
ASSESSMENT AND ELIGIBILITY: 
POLICY BACKGROUND 
• The Government committed to ‘‘Introducing a 
national minimum eligibility threshold to ensure 
greater national consistency in access to care and 
support, and ensuring that no-one’s care is 
interrupted if they move’’ (HMG, 2012) 
• It also committed to “develop and test options for a 
potential new assessment and eligibility framework, 
in consultation with people who use services, carers, 
academics, local authorities, social workers, and 
health and care professionals” (HMG, 2012) 
 
STUDY OF ASSESSMENT AND 
ELIGIBILITY FRAMEWORKS 
• We examined the assessment and eligibility 
systems for social care in six countries 
• The aim was to draw lessons from other 
countries to inform discussions on the 
development of a new framework for England 
• We studied a range of issues including: 
– Use of standard instruments and algorithms 
– National standardisation or local flexibility 
– Role of unpaid informal care 
INSTRUMENTS AND ALGORITHMS  
Broad range of instruments and algorithms, which vary 
in their degree of objectivity and comprehensiveness 
– Objectivity: the extent to which the assessor’s professional 
judgement can influence decisions 
– Comprehensiveness: breadth of information collected 
• ‘Objectivity’ and comprehensiveness can support 
fairness objectives, but also come with costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Australia England 
New 
Zealand 
Netherlands Germany France 
Assessment 
Instruments 
No national 
instrument 
No national 
instrument 
interRAI-HC 
and 
interRAI-
LTCF 
Detailed 
guidance using 
several 
instruments 
Zeittabel AGGIR 
Eligibility and 
Resource 
Allocation 
Algorithms 
No national 
algorithm 
No national 
algorithm 
No national 
algorithm 
Detailed 
guidance 
Duration-
based, 
objective 
rules 
AGGIR 
RULES USED FOR ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA 
Significant variety in the formality/objectivity and 
comprehensiveness of rules used to make eligibility 
decisions and allocate public funding for long-term care 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany: 
Care level 2 when for six months – 
The person needs assistance in at least 
two basic ADLs at least three times a day 
at various times and additional help in 
IADLs several times a week for at least 
three hours a day with two hours 
accounted for by personal care. 
England (FACS): 
Substantial when – 
there is, or will be, only partial choice and 
control over the immediate environment; 
and/or  
abuse or neglect has occurred or will occur; 
and/or 
there is, or will be, an inability to carry out the 
majority of personal care or domestic  
routines; and/or  
involvement in many aspects of work, 
education or learning cannot or will not be 
sustained; 
SUMMARY POINTS ON INSTRUMENTS AND 
ALGORITHMS 
• Assessment and eligibility instruments and algorithms 
influence the overall efficiency and equity properties of a 
given framework 
• The objectivity and comprehensiveness of assessment 
instruments are important, but no single instrument has 
emerged across the countries in our sample 
• Similarly, no algorithmic approach to eligibility and resource 
allocation has been adopted in more than one country 
 
 
FUNCTIONS THAT COULD BE 
NATIONAL OR LOCAL 
• Role and scope of assessments  
• Assessment processes 
• Assessment instruments 
• Eligibility criteria and thresholds  
• Processes for determining eligibility 
• Resource allocation systems 
• Care management and reviews  
 
DEGREE OF NATIONAL 
UNIFORMITY 
IMPLICATIONS OF GREATER NATIONAL 
UNIFORMITY 
• Greater national uniformity of processes might lead to greater 
efficiency in terms of lower assessment costs per person 
• It might make the targeting of resources to needs less 
satisfactory, in which case maximising outcomes for given 
resources would not be best promoted by a system that left 
minimal scope for local discretion 
• It should mean that (at least the perception of) variation in 
eligibility for services is reduced and that portability of 
assessments between areas is improved 
• There is a trade-off between efficiency and equity objectives 
when deciding whether eligibility criteria and allocations 
should be determined on a nationally uniform basis  
 
IMPLICATIONS OF GREATER NATIONAL 
UNIFORMITY 
• Greater national uniformity should in principle mean that 
where people live will have less impact on their assessed 
eligibility for care or on the level of funding they receive 
• It will probably not mean that where people live will have no 
impact on their assessed eligibility and care packages, since 
an earlier study found variability even within English councils 
• An important point is that, unless the funding responsibility 
for social care is transferred from local to central government, 
councils will still need to be able to flex care packages to 
contain costs within local budgets  
 
CARER ASSESSMENTS AND ELIGIBILITY 
CRITERIA FOR CARER SUPPORT  
• England appears to be the only country among the six in 
which is giving unpaid carers a clear entitlement to an 
assessment of their own needs in their own right and an 
entitlement to care support in their own right 
• Legislation before Parliament extends the right to a carer’s 
assessment, provides an entitlement to public support and 
gives local authorities a duty to provide support to carers 
which will be equivalent to that for service users 
• The other countries provide support specifically for carers 
flowing from the assessment of the person requiring care 
and support 
• It should be recognised that services for the person 
needing care often benefit the person’s unpaid carers 
 
INFORMAL CARE AND ASSESSMENT 
AND ELIGIBILITY FRAMEWORKS  
• The role of unpaid carers raises a number of questions:  
– Are unpaid carers consulted in the assessment of those for whom they 
provide care? 
– What happens if there are conflicts between the interests of unpaid 
carers and their care recipients? 
– Can unpaid carers request an assessment of their own needs? How is 
their assessment linked to the assessment of the care recipient?    
– What publicly funded services or other support are available to assist 
carers? 
– What are the criteria for carers’ eligibility for carer support services 
and are they similar to the eligibility criteria for disabled people? 
– Do the eligibility criteria and resource allocation decisions take 
account of input from unpaid carers such that those with carers 
receive less care or lower payments than those without carers? 
• Our study concentrated on the last two of these 
 
ELIGIBILITY FOR CARER SUPPORT 
• Setting eligibility criteria for carer support raises similar 
efficiency and equity issues as setting them for services for 
people needing care plus some additional issues  
• There is the difficult question about achieving the most 
efficient and equitable balance between support for carers 
and support for those needing care  
• Whether greater overall welfare could be achieved by a 
marginal shift of resources from services for frail older people 
to carer support is an empirical question   
• Whether such a shift would improve equity is however a 
normative question, which depends in part on the relative 
weights attached to the welfare of carers and care recipients 
 
CARER-SIGHTED AND CARER-BLIND 
ELIGIBILITY FRAMEWORKS 
• The English system is carer-sighted: disabled people with 
carers receive, other factors equal, less care than those 
without carers 
• The German system does not take direct account of unpaid 
care when determining eligibility for benefits 
• In France, the availability of informal care does not influence 
which of six needs groups a client falls into but  is considered 
in determining the size and content of the care plan 
• The Dutch eligibility framework distinguishes between the 
‘usual care’ provided by others living in the same house as the 
client, and support provided by others living elsewhere: public 
support should not replace ‘usual care’ 
 
CARER-SIGHTED AND CARER-BLIND 
ELIGIBILITY FRAMEWORKS 
• Whether a carer-blind system is more efficient at maximising 
societal welfare than a carer-sighted system is ultimately an 
empirical question  
• If the system is carer-sighted there is a further empirical 
question about how much smaller care packages should be 
for those with unpaid carers in comparison with packages for 
those without carers  
• Whether it is equitable to operate a carer-sighted system is by 
contrast a normative question 
• If emphasis is placed on achieving equality of access to similar 
care packages, a carer-blind system may seem more equitable  
• If greater emphasis is placed on achieving similar outcomes 
for all people needing care, however, a carer-sighted system 
may seem more equitable  
 
FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE 
• We have conducted a range of studies on the 
financing of long-term care, including 
international comparative studies 
• Our aim is to inform decisions by providing 
evidence on the costs, benefits and other 
impacts of different ways of financing care 
• The key issue addressed by a series of reviews 
in the UK is the balance between public 
funding and private responsibility   
CURRENT MEANS-TESTED 
FUNDING SYSTEM IN ENGLAND 
• Upper capital limit of £25,250, above which USER IS 
ineligible for local authority support 
• Lower capital limit of £12,250, savings below which 
are completely ignored in the means test 
• Tariff rate of £1 per week per £250 savings between 
the two capital limits 
• Almost all income taken into account in means test 
for residential care 
• Almost all income above a set threshold taken into 
account in means test for home-based care 
 
BALANCE OF RISK 
How is the risk of care costs apportioned: 
• Social insurance (Germany) 
• General taxation (Austria, Denmark) 
• Taxation and social insurance (Japan) 
• Taxation and private insurance (France, Israel) 
• Tax funded safety net and users (USA, England) 
The balance between public and private funding 
has been at the core of the debate In the UK 
 
FREE PERSONAL CARE 
• Recommended by Royal Commission (1999) 
and Labour Govt White Paper (2010) 
• Wide pooling of risks of catastrophic costs 
• No means test involved 
• Estimated to increase public expenditure on 
social care for older people by some 40% 
• Beneficiaries concentrated in top two quintiles 
of older population 
PRIVATE LONG-TERM CARE 
INSURANCE 
• Around 10% of people aged 65 will have life-time 
care costs exceeding £100,000 
• It is more efficient for risk averse people to purchase 
insurance than to save for long-term care costs 
• Yet, unlike in other countries, private long-term care 
insurance is no longer available in the UK (except for 
immediate needs annuities): the market failed 
following low demand and high costs 
• This market failure led the expert Dilnot Commission 
to recommend in 2011 a cap on life-time care costs 
 
 
GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS 
• A cap of £72,000 is to be introduced in 2016 
on life-time care costs, relating to care costs 
but not hotel costs in care homes  
• The upper capital limit for residential care is to 
be raised in 2016 to £118,000, with no change 
in lower capital limit or tariff rate 
• The proposals are still subject to approval by 
Parliament and the details are complex  
 
 
LIFE-TIME CAP ON CARE COSTS 
• Recommended by Commission on Funding of 
Care and Support (2011)  
• Wide pooling of risks of catastrophic costs, 
subject to user meeting an excess 
• Estimated to increase public expenditure on 
social care for older people by around 25% 
• Beneficiaries concentrated in top two quintiles 
of older population 
 
PSSRU AGGREGATE PROJECTIONS 
MODELS OF LONG-TERM CARE 
These produce projections of: 
• Numbers of disabled older/younger people 
• Numbers of users of informal care, formal care 
services and disability benefits 
• Public and (for older people) private 
expenditure on long-term care 
• Workforce providing social care  
  
DYNAMIC MICROSIMULATION 
MODELS 
This produces projections for older people of: 
• Numbers of service users 
• Public and private expenditure on long-term 
care and support 
• Unmet need for care 
• Care pathways and life-time costs 
• Winners and losers from reforms 
 
DRIVERS OF DEMAND FOR CARE 
• Life expectancy and mortality rates 
• Disability rates - compression or expansion of 
morbidity and disability 
• Household composition and informal care 
• Unit costs of care such as the cost of an hour’s 
home care 
• Public expectations about long-term care  
 
BASE CASE ASSUMPTIONS FOR 
PROJECTIONS 
• Number of people by age, gender and marital 
status changes in line with official projections  
• Prevalence rates of disability by age and 
gender remain unchanged  
• Unit costs are constant to 2015/6 and then 
rise by 2.0% per year in real terms  
• Patterns of care – formal and informal – and 
the funding system remain unchanged 
DEMAND PRESSURES, OLDER PEOPLE 
IN ENGLAND, 2010 TO 2030 
• The number of disabled older people is projected to 
rise by 59% between 2010 and 2030 (from 1.0 in 
2010 to 1.6 million in 2030) 
• This is sensitive to assumptions about future 
mortality and disability rates 
• The number of older users of care services would 
need to rise by 63% between 2010 and 2030 to keep 
pace with demographic pressures 
• A higher rise would be required if unpaid care by 
children did not rise in line with demand 
PROJECTED PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON LONG-
TERM CARE FOR OLDER PEOPLE, 2010 TO 2030 
• Public expenditure in England on long-term 
health and social care for older people and on 
disability benefits used towards care costs is 
estimated to be £12 billion in 2010 
• It is projected to more than double by 2030, 
to £25.5 billion in 2010 prices, to keep pace 
with demographic and economic pressures 
• This would be a rise from around 0.95% of 
GDP in 2010 to 1.3% of GDP in 2030 
CONCLUSION 
The financing of long-term care for raises 
economic issues on: 
• Economic efficiency and incentives 
• Equity including intergenerational equity 
• Balance of risk between public and private funding 
• Sustainability of public expenditures 
Decisions require value judgements but should 
be informed by evidence on the impacts of 
different approaches 
 
